Velocity and monetary policy in 1982 by Michael W. Keran
This Letter makes the case forthe latter
proposition. In essence, we argue that the
decline in inflation and inflation expecta-
tionsthatstarted in mid-1981 and continued
through the endof1982 should beexpected
to increase the demand for all financial
assets, including M 1. This would suggest
that the velocityofall monetary aggregates
(not just M 1) would decline in 1982, which
they did. The key point is that adecline in
inflation expectations raises the.quantityof
M 1peoplewish to hold relativetoany given
level ofincome, changing the money-
income relationship and causing velocity
to fall.
The one major exception to this stable
demand forMl occurred in about 1974-75
when there was a downward shift in the
demand for M1 ofabout 10 percentage
points. The actual level ofM 1 fell about 10
percentage points below that forecasted on
the basis ofthe income and interest rates
in those years. Subsequent analysis ofthat
episode suggested that financial innovation
in response to high rates of inflation created
majorincentivesfor the public(largelybusi-
Moneydemand
The public's demand for M1 is based on the
level ofincome and the level ofinterestrates
on competing assets. A rise in incomewill
increase the quantityofM1 the public
wishes to hold because itwill engage in
moretransactions. A rise in interest rates will
reduce the quantityofMl the public wishes
to hold, because securities would become
more attractivethan money. The relation
between M 1on the one hand and income
and interest rates on the other has been one
ofthe most stable empirical relationships in
economics. This means that thedemand for
money has been stable over time.
analysis, then the decline in Ml velocity,
while unprecedented, should not necessar-
ily affect its usefulness as aguide to policy.
The rule can also be stated in terms ofthe
velocity ofM 1. Velocity is the rate at which
each dollarofmoneyturns over in agiven
time period, usually one year. The money-
Income relationship restated would be that
velocity has grown at a rate ofabout 3
percent·a year.
The answer to that question depends on
the cause ofthe decline in velocity. Ifthe
declinewas due to an unexpected shift in
the demand for M 1 (perhaps because ofthe
unexpected severity ofthe recession), then
M 1 has at leasttemporarily lost its role as a
primary guide to policy. If, however, 1982
can be explained by standard economic
While weeklyMl figures may be highly
variable, it is widely recognized that the
Federal Reserve can closely control the
growth ofMloverthe period ofayear.
Should the relationship between Ml and
GNP remain stable, the Fed could presum-
ably exert a strong influenceon the growth
rate ofGNP. However, a majorexception
to the stable money-income relationship
occurred in 1982. As shown in Chart 1, M 1
grewatan average year-aver-year rate of6%
percent while nominal GNP grew by 4%
percent. Instead ofrising byabout 3 per-
centagepoints as past historywould suggest,
velocity actually fell by two percentage
points. This has not happened since the
1930s and raises the major policy question:
Can M 1 continue t6 be used as aguide to
policy in 1983 and beyond?
Velocity and Monetary Policy in 1982
Every profession has rules-of-thumb to
simplify highlycomplex relationships. In
monetary economics, such a rule is that
nominal GNPwill, on average, grow about
3 percent faster than the money stock
(defined as M 1, which equals currency plus
all checkabledeposits). In fact, from 1960to
1981, the average annual growth rate in
GNP hasbeen about 3 percent higherthan
the average annual growth rate in M 1.
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ness) to economize on M1. This called into
question the use ofM1 as a guide to policy.
The velocitydecline in 1982 could plausibly
be related to similar circumstanct;s. High
rates ofinflation through 1981, inducing
financial innovation and deregulation,
could have changed the demand for M1
(especially for households). However, a
close look at the evidence suggests this was
not the case. First, financial innovation
would, ifanything, have reduced the
demand for M1 and raised velocity as in
1974-75, but, in fact, velocity fell. Second,
the actual growth in M1 in 1982 is about in
line with forecasts from a money market
model developed at the Federal Reserve
Bank ofSan Francisco. Usingihismodel, the
one quarter ahead and full year (ex ante)
forecastsofM1 in 1982 wererelativelyclose
to the actual growth rates ofM1 *. The results
ofthis model imply thatthe demand for M 1
was stable in 1982.
Stable demand for money means that the
relationship between moneyon the one
hand and interest rates and incomeon the
otherwas stable. What then explains.the
dramatic decline in velocity, which is the
relation between moneyand income? We
will startwith abrieftheoretical explanation
(which the non-technical reader may skip).
A technical digression
The standard wayofexplaining the money-
incomerelation is bydescribingthe equilib-
rium conditions in the money market and
the goods market, shown in Figure 1. The
supply and demand for money is summa-
rized by what is called the LM (for liquidity/
money) curve. The equilibrium conditions
in the goods marketare described bywhat is
called the IS (for investment/savings) curve.
The LM curve shows the different combina-
tions ofinterest rates and income that will
equate the supply and demand for money.
The IS curve shows the combinations ofin-
terest rates and income thatwill equate
investmentand savings.
2
Simultaneous equilibrium in the goods and
money markets is achieved where the LM
curve intersects the IS curve. However, the
relevant interestrate thatequates supplyand
demand for money is the nominal or market
interest rate (R), while the interest rate that
equates investmentand savings in the goods
market is the real interest rate (R*) i.e., the
nominal interest rale adjusted for expected
inflation. Therefore, a "wedge" consisting
ofthe expected inflation rate can separate
the LM and IS curves.
For example, when market and real interest
rates are the same (inflationexpectationsare.
zero), the equilibrium income in Figure 1 is
at point A. When inflation expectations are
positive, the equilibrium income will be at
point B. As shown, with a positive inflation
expectation of(ape), income at point B
clears the money market (LM) ata nominal
interest rate (R) but clears the goods market
(IS) at the real interest rate (R*).
Ifwe assume that inflation expectations
suddenly disppear, the inflation expecta-
tions wedgeseparating the LM and IS curves
would also disappearand thenominal inter-
est rate would equal the real interest rate.
The equilibrium level ofincome would
move from point Bto pointA and velocity
would decline, that is, income would
decline with no decline in money. The
eventsof 1982 are consistent with this
theoretical explanation in which a stable
demand formoney(stayingon the LMcurve)
occurs with a decline in velocity.
What happened in 1982?
Starting in 1981 and continuing through
December 1982, the year-over-year infla-
tion rate declined from over 10percenlto 5
percent (see Chart 2). On the assumption
that inflation expected over the nextthree
to six months is closely related to the infla-
tion actually experienced over the last year,
"'For example, the mean absolute error (MAE) in one, two
and three month ahead forecasts were 3.8, 2.1, and 1.7
percent, respectively.The fuJI~year forecast errorwasalow
0,6 percent.On this basis, the rapid growth ofM1 in the
second halfof 1982 was an appropriate
response to the decline in inflation expecta-
tions. How long this rapid M1 growth rate
should continue is a matterofjudgment. In
principle, however, M1 growth should not
exceed the increased desire to hold M 1 as a
result ofthe decline in inflation expecta-
tions. Detailed empirical estimates ofthe
exact magnitudeofthat level ofadjustment
in M1 will vary. But, ifthe inflation rate in
1983 does notdrop significantly below the
5 percent inflation of 1982, then velocity
should resume a more normal pattern and
M 1 begin to grow at a more normal rate
some time during 1983. M' h I W K
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way as to keep the growth in M 1 at a rela-
tively low5.7percent. As aresult,. short-term
market interest rates (measured by three-
month Treasury bills) averaged 12% per-
cent, While the inflation rate declined. The
resulting rise in the real interest rate led to
aslowerthan expected growth in income,
especially in the second halfof 1982:Start-
ing in July, however, market interest rates
fell substantially, such that three-month
Treasury bills averaged 8 percent in the
period from September to December 1982.
This4V, percent decline in the Treasury biII
rate was approximately in line with the
decline in inflation. The result was an 11.3
percentrise inM1 in the second halfof1982
to alevel approximately3 percentage points
above the top ofthe Federal Reserve's 5%
percent target range by the fourth quarter.
The San Francisco money market model
forecast the lowfirst halfM1 growth with a
0.5 percent error and the rapid second half
M1 growth with a0.9 percent error.
Conclusion
Put simply, a majordecline in the inflation
rate will, on balance, raise the amountof
moneythe public is willingto hold at any
level of income. As aresult, the velocity of
money-,the ratio (GNP/M1)-mustfall. If
the supplyofmoneywerenotincreased, the














Second, ifthe money supply were not in-
creased, then market interest rates would
notfall in line with the decline in inflation
expectations and real. interest rates wouId
rise. Higherreal interest rates would imply
greater incentives to save and reduced
incentives to invest, and put downward
pressure on income. In this case, velocity
would fall because the level ofnominal
income had fallen while the quantityof
money remained unchanged.
In the.real world, both of these develop-
ments occurred. In the first halfof 1982,
monetary policy was conducted in such a
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there has been a reduction in short-run in-
flation expectations ofover 5 percentage
points. Thus, the wedge between short-term
market interest rates and short-run real
interest rates should have been cut in half
over the last year and a half.
Such adecline in inflation expectations
should, by itself, lead to adecline in the
velocity ofM 1. Such a velocity decline
could occur in one oftwo ways. First, the
decline in inflation expectations could be
followed by a parallel decline in market
interest rates ofan equal amount with no
effecton real interest rates or income. Such
adecline in market interest rates would
lead to an increase in the public's desire to
hold M1-type balances. The San Francisco
money market model suggests that a 5 per-
centage pointdecline in market interest
rates (parallel with the 5 percentage point
decline in inflation expectations) would
increase by about 3 percentage points the
quantity ofM1 the public is willingto hold.
This greater willingness to hold M1 must be
fu lIyaccommodated byan equal increase in
the supply ofmoney ifinterest rates are to
fall by the full decline in inflation expecta-
tions. The increase in the stockofM1 would
notstimulate an increase in incomebecause
there wouId be nodecline in the reaIinterest
rate. Underthisscenario, the decline in
velocity would occurbecause M1 increased
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BANKING DATA--TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











loans (gross, adjusted) and investments'" 164,231 1,186 6,333 4.0
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 142,690 1,033 6,120 4.5
Commercial and industrial . 45,294 366 3,199 7.6
Real estate 57,276 - 91 510 0.9
loans to individuals 23,586 °
317 1.4
Securities loans 2,641 391 459 21.0
U.s. Treasury securities'" 7,936 335 1,697 27.2
Othersecurities'" 13,603 - 182 - 1,484 - 9.8
Demand deposits - total# 41,684 2,235 1,489 3.7
Demand deposits - adjusted 28,334 2,043 1,906 7.2
Savings de(X)sits - total 63,869 1/043 33,078 107.4
Timedeposits--total# 70,177 -1,341 - 22,228 - 24.7
IndiViduals, part. & corp. 62,159 -1,026 - 20,431 - 24.7
(Large negotiableCD'sl 22,975 - 753 - 12,929 - 36.0
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings
















*Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
Editorialcomments may beaddressedtotheeditor (Gregory Tong) ortothe author ....Freecopiesof this and
other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public Infonnation Section}
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Sox 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 974~2246.